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CHAPTER 5
Housing Policies  
in Singapore 
Sock-Yong Phang and Matthias Helble
5.1Introduction
In 2015, Singapore’s population was 5.54 million, of which 3.38 million 
were citizens, 0.53 million were permanent residents, and 1.63 million 
were foreigners. One-ﬁfth of its land area of 719 square kilometers (km2) 
comprised reclaimed land (Table 5.1). Land scarcity and high population 
density (over 7,600 persons per km2) provide justiﬁcation for the 
dominance of the state in land ownership and housing provision, and 
the high level of intervention in the housing sector. The homeownership 
rate for the resident population has been above 90% since the early 
1990s. Among resident employed households, the 2014 median 
household income from work was S$8,292 per month,1 or S$99,504 per 
year.2 The median house type is a four-room (approximately 90 square 
meters [m2]) ﬂat sold by the Housing & Development Board (HDB), the 
government housing agency, on a 99-year leasehold basis. The median 
house price (market values) to annual household income ratio for 2015 
was estimated at 5.0 (Demographia 2016).
1 Statistics are from Singapore government agency websites and Singapore Department 
of Statistics (2015). 
2 The exchange rate on 18 July 2016 was S$1.35 = US$1.00.
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Table 5.1: Population, Land Area, and Density of Singapore,  
1970–2015
Year
Land Area
(km2)
Population 
Density 
(per km2)
Total
Population
Singapore 
Residents
Proportion of 
Foreigners 
(%)
1970 586 3,540 2,074,507 2,013,563 3
1980 618 3,906 2,413,945 2,282,125 5
1990 633 4,814 3,047,132 2,735,868 10
2000 683 5,897 4,027,887 3,273,363 19
2010 712 7,130 5,076,732 3,771,721 26
2015 719 7,698 5,535,002 3,902,690 29
km2 = square kilometer. 
Source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics.
Table 5.1 shows the increase in population and its changing 
composition by nationality status. The foreign component of Singapore’s 
population has increased signiﬁcantly, from 10% in 1990 to 19% in 
2000, and was 29% in 2015. Permanent residents (who are not citizens) 
accounted for another 10% and citizens comprised 61% of the population 
in 2015. These statistics on changes in population composition are 
relevant for housing policy as the housing market in Singapore is highly 
segmented according to households’ nationality status.
In the decades since the ﬁrst elections were held in 1959 for self-
government and since independence in 1965, Singapore has been ruled by 
the People’s Action Party (PAP). The successful public housing program 
is “a foundation stone upon which … the PAP … builds its legitimacy 
among Singaporeans” (Chua 1997, preface). The unique housing system 
has 75% of the housing stock in 2015 classiﬁed as “public housing” 
built predominantly by the HDB; 82% of the resident population live 
in HDB estates, of which 79% lived in HDB-sold ﬂats. Demand for 
homeownership is driven by the housing ﬁnance system introduced in 
1968 when Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings were allowed to be 
used for down payment and mortgage payments for HDB ﬂats. 
The HDB–CPF framework established in the 1960s has transformed 
the urban form of Singapore and remains largely intact 5 decades on. 
Between 1960 and 2013, the ratio of housing investment to gross domestic 
product (GDP) averaged 7%, with the ratio of housing investment to 
total investment averaging 23% (Figure 5.1). These ratios are high by 
international standards and reﬂect the policy attention and resources 
channeled into the housing sector.  
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HDB rental and direct purchases (one unit per household) are 
restricted to citizens, with current monthly gross household income 
caps at S$1,500 for rental and S$12,000 for direct purchase, respectively. 
The Executive Condominium scheme, a hybrid public–private housing 
scheme for citizen households, has a household income cap of S$14,000. 
The resale HDB sector is available to citizens and Singapore permanent 
residents (SPRs). However, HDB housing grants are calibrated by taking 
into account citizenship, marital status, proximity to parents’ home, and 
household income of purchaser households. The private housing sector 
is dominated by transactions by higher-income Singapore citizens, SPRs, 
expatriates, and foreign investors. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of 
resident households by dwelling type and average monthly household 
incomes. Of the 1.2 million resident households in 2014, 80% resided in 
HDB-built ﬂats.
Figure 5.1: Housing Investment Ratios in Singapore, 1960–2013 
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Data source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics website.
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Table 5.2: Resident Households by Dwelling Type and Household 
Income in Singapore, 2014
Dwelling Type Resident Households
Average Monthly Household 
Income from Work among 
Resident Employed 
Households (S$)
Total 1,200,000 = 100%
Total HDB 80.4%
1- and 2-room ﬂats 5.3% 2,313
3-room ﬂats 18.3% 5,805
4-room ﬂats 32.2% 8,293
5-room and executive ﬂats 24.4% 11,606
Private House Types
Condominiums and other 
apartments 13.5% 19,843
Landed properties 5.8% 27,363
HDB = Housing & Development Board, m2 = square meter. 
Note: Average HDB ﬂat sizes estimated from 2015 resale transaction data: 1-room 33 m2; 2-room 45 
m2; 3-room 73 m2; 4-room 96 m2; 5-room 115 m2. Private housing has much wider variation in sizes and 
amenities.
Source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics (2015).
The housing policy in Singapore has evolved over time in response to 
different housing challenges. Phang (2015c, 12) states that “in the 1960s, 
the political turbulence of self-government, merger with Malaysia, and 
unexpected independence were not conducive to attracting long-term 
investments. On the housing front, the government was faced with a 
largely immigrant and growing population, a chronic housing shortage 
as well as insufficient private-sector resources and capacity to provide 
adequate solutions.” Measures that had previously been undertaken by 
the British colonial government in town planning and the provision of 
rental houses and ﬂats proved wholly inadequate. Public housing built 
by the Singapore Improvement Trust3 housed 8.8% of the population 
by 1959, with the majority living in overcrowded prewar rent-controlled 
apartments lacking access to water and modern sanitation. Others faced 
housing conditions comparable to today’s slums. Given this lack of 
adequate housing, the newly elected government made it a priority to 
3 See Phang (1992, Chapter 3) for a description of the Singapore Improvement Trust 
and other public sector agencies involved in housing development in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
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provide homes on a large scale. The government developed its housing 
policies based on three pillars: the establishment of the HDB in 1960, the 
enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1966, and the expansion of the 
role of the CPF to become a housing ﬁnance institution in 1968.
By the 1970s, the HDB–CPF housing framework, representing 
a tightly integrated land–housing supply and ﬁnancing system, was 
working effectively to channel resources into the housing sector. With 
the HDB–CPF system in place, the housing shortage was resolved by the 
1980s. In the 1990s, the challenge was that of renewing aging estates and 
of creating a market for HDB transactions as households upgraded to 
larger ﬂats and private housing. Housing subsidies on the demand side in 
the form of housing grants were also introduced. The more recent (since 
2000) housing policy challenges include the need to curb speculative 
and investment housing demand, the increase in income inequalities, as 
well as an aging population. These have brought about the introduction 
of carefully crafted macroprudential policies, targeted housing grants to 
assist low- and middle-income households, and schemes to help elderly 
households monetize their housing equity.4 
5.2The Land Acquisition Act, 1966
Singapore, a former British colony, held its ﬁrst general elections as a 
fully self-governing state in 1959, joined the Federation of Malaysia 
in 1963, and became an independent republic in 1965. The housing 
situation prior to independence was one of acute shortage, resulting in 
overcrowding, misery, slums, and squatter settlements. It was during 
such a period of political uncertainty and housing crisis that legislation 
and amendments for urban and housing sector transformations were 
passed. Recognizing that the prerequisite for a successful public housing 
program was the availability of inexpensive land, the government paid 
much attention to amending legislation on land acquisition by the state 
from the early 1960s. The Land Acquisition Act of 1966 was a crucial 
step in Singapore’s housing policies and economic development and has 
had major redistribution effects (Phang 1996, 2015a).   
In 1964, the Land Acquisition Bill was debated in the legislative 
assembly while Singapore was a part of the Federation of Malaysia. 
Then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained that the approach to 
determining compensation for land acquired by the government should 
be the prevention of economic windfalls to landowners (Singapore 
Parliamentary Reports, 10 June 1964): 
4 See Phang (1992, 2007, 2015c) for historical accounts and updates of housing policies.
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“First, that no private landowner should beneﬁt from development 
which had taken place at public expense; and secondly, the price 
paid on the acquisition for public purposes should not be higher 
than what the land would have been worth had the Government 
not contemplated development generally in the area.”5
On the matter of land acquisition, the views expounded by the Prime 
Minister were, however, inconsistent with Article 13 of the Malaysian 
Constitution, which provides for the right to adequate compensation in 
the event of compulsory acquisition. Upon independence in August 1965, 
the Singapore Parliament adopted all the provisions of the Malaysian 
Constitution regarding fundamental rights except for Article 13. 
The Land Acquisition Act, enacted in 1966, gives the state broad 
powers to acquire land:
(a) for any public purpose;
(b) by any person, corporation or statutory board, for any work 
or an undertaking which, in the opinion of the Minister, is of 
public beneﬁt or of public utility or in the public interest; or
(c) for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes.
Landowners cannot object to the decision, and appeals on 
compensation can only be made to an Appeals Board and not to the 
courts. Initially, almost all legal owners appealed the compensation 
awards and, in 1973, the concept of a statutory date was introduced. In 
the words of the Prime Minister (K. Y. Lee 2000, 118–119): 
“Later, I further amended the law to give the government the 
power to acquire land for public purposes at its value on a 
date ﬁxed at 30 November 1973. I saw no reason why private 
landowners should proﬁt from an increase in land value brought 
about by economic development and the infrastructure paid for 
with public funds.”
Between 1975 and 1990, the annual GDP growth rate averaged 
8%. The private housing price index grew at an average real rate of 
10% per year. Land prices would have increased by much more than 
housing prices. Many private landowners were, however, unable to avail 
themselves of this high rate of return as the government acquired land 
not at market prices but at compensation ﬁxed at the lower of 1973 prices 
5 See also Centre for Liveable Cities (2014: 12–18). 
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or market values for most of that period. Compensation was capped at 
1973 levels for about 14 years between 1973 and 1987, with no allowance 
being made for market valuation or the landowner’s purchase price. 
Exceptions were made on a case-by-case basis. 
Singapore has since moved to a more market-based approach for 
compensation of acquired land. Subsequent amendments to the Land 
Acquisition Act changed the statutory date for purposes of valuation for 
compensation to 1 January of 1986, 1992, and 1995. In 2007, the use of a 
historical statutory date was removed by Parliament, and compensation 
has since been pegged to full market value. 
State land, as a proportion of total land, grew from 44% in 1960 to 76% 
by 1985, and was about 90% by 2005.6 A signiﬁcant portion of the increase 
in state land can be attributed to land reclamation. Land acquisition was 
an important step in Singapore’s housing policies. However, it meant that 
existing owners had to be expropriated. In most other countries, such 
clearance would have encountered strong resistance by dwellers. This 
was also the case in 1960s Singapore when resettlement was initially 
viewed with hostility and suspicion (Centre for Liveable Cities 2014, 21). 
To overcome resistance, the government’s policy was to provide suitable 
alternative accommodation for all businesses and persons affected by 
its land acquisition programs. Planners at that time estimated that for 
every slum structure demolished then, seven new ﬂats were required 
to relocate families affected (Choe 1975). This meant that the processes 
for public housing construction, land acquisition, slum clearance and 
resettlement, and urban renewal in Singapore were closely interrelated. 
Chua (1997, 132) shows how commitment to universal provision of 
housing “allowed the PAP government to take the strong moral high 
ground on acquisition of land for public housing.”
A detailed study of land acquisition and resettlement can be found 
in Centre for Liveable Cities (2014). The study highlights several 
reasons for the relative success of land acquisition and resettlement in 
Singapore as compared with obstacles and resistance in other countries. 
These included the following factors:
(i) Legal and constitutional mandate as well as clear processes 
in the form of the Land Acquisition Act that established 
legitimacy and the rule of law in the conduct of public officials 
carrying out these duties.
6 Phang (1992: 24) and Singapore Land Authority website, http://sla.gov.sg (accessed 
25 October 2005).
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(ii) Meticulous and detailed processes for record keeping and 
calculation of compensation for squatters’ assets at market value.
(iii) The superiority of alternative accommodation, business 
premises, and environments offered by the government to 
affected people to replace the land or property that had been 
taken from them—although squatters had no legal interest in 
the affected land, they were compensated for improvements 
(such as shacks, vegetable plots, and livestock) and were also 
given priority allocation of new HDB ﬂats and land in the case 
of farmers.
(iv) Effective forward planning and coordination to ensure 
smooth resettlement due largely to the integrated housing, 
resettlement, and estate planning functions of the HDB 
because the Resettlement Department was housed within the 
HDB from 1963.
Subsidiary legislation in the form of the State Land Rules, 1968 
provided that titles for state-owned land should be for terms not 
exceeding 99 years. Through the Land Acquisition Act, the government 
cleared low-density housing, slums, villages, and squatter areas, and 
assembled land parcels. State land was leased to government agencies 
for the development of high-rise “public” housing that were sold 
on a 99-year leasehold basis to eligible households, as well as for the 
development of industrial estates, educational institutions, and other 
urban public amenities. Up to half of the land acquired by the state since 
the enactment of the act has been allocated for housing development by 
both the public and private sectors (Phang 1996). 
Singapore’s land policies can be described as land reform in an 
urban setting. It involved a massive transfer of land resource from 
private landowners to the state in the ﬁrst 2 decades after independence. 
That large plots of land in Singapore were owned by a small number of 
wealthy landowners during the 1960s helped explain why acquiring land 
from this group was regarded as fair by Parliament (Centre for Liveable 
Cities 2014: 7).7 Chua (1997, 134) writes that “the popularity of the 
government’s action among the overwhelming propertyless electorate 
enabled it to bear the rejection of this very small minority.” The major 
acquisition and redistribution of a critical resource contributed to the 
development of industrial estates, the ﬁnancial district, commercial 
developments, the large public housing program, and public sector 
7 Large agricultural plots outside the city were owned by wealthy individuals and 
British private companies.
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infrastructure development. The Land Acquisition Act of 1966 thus 
underpinned the successful economic development of Singapore (Phang 
1996).
Public land leasing for private sector development generally falls 
under the term Government Land Sales in Singapore.8 Much urban 
redevelopment in Singapore has been achieved through this land sales 
program, administered mainly by the Urban Redevelopment Authority 
and, to a lesser extent, the HDB. Under the program, the government 
amalgamated or reclaimed land, inserted infrastructure, provided 
planning and urban design guidelines, and released the land for sale to 
private (including foreign) developers (Phang 2005). Sites are usually 
sold on 99-year leases for commercial, hotel, and private residential 
development, whereas leases for industrial sites are usually for 60 years 
or less. The lease tenure for other types of sites varies depending on the 
uses. The usual sale method is through public tender. 
Proceeds from land sales do not constitute part of the government’s 
operating revenue but are instead channeled into government reserves. 
Singapore’s public wealth is estimated to be more than 2.5 times 
its GDP. These are the net assets of the two sovereign wealth funds 
(Temasek Holdings and the Government Investment Corporation) and 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Investment incomes from these 
institutions contribute to the government’s annual operating revenue.
5.3 The Housing & Development Board–Central 
Provident Fund Housing Framework 
The HDB is the key pillar of Singapore’s housing system. The 
achievements of the HDB, including its dominant role in Singapore’s 
housing sector, have been extensively documented elsewhere.9 This 
section draws from the existing literature and provides a brief summary 
of the main features of the framework. 
The HDB began operations on 1 February 1960. It replaced the 
Singapore Improvement Trust and was set up as a statutory board to 
provide “decent homes equipped with modern amenities for all those 
who needed them” (Teh 1975: 6). A target of 110,000 dwelling units to 
8 See Urban Redevelopment Authority web page at https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/
9 Notable government publications include Yeh (1975), Wong and Yeh (1985), 
Fernandez (2011), and Centre for Liveable Cities and HDB (2013). Academic 
publications include Chua (1997), Phang (1992, 2007, 2013a, 2015c), and Kim and 
Phang (2013).
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be built was set for 1960–1970. On 25 May 1961, a huge ﬁre broke out 
in the Bukit Ho Swee squatter district, which rendered about 16,000 
people homeless. Housing the victims of the ﬁre became the HDB’s ﬁrst 
major challenge. The government compulsorily acquired the burned-
out land as a site for 12,000 low-cost ﬂats and promised to complete the 
ﬁrst blocks of ﬂats within 9 months. The ﬁrst ﬁve blocks of ﬂats were 
completed by February 1962 and all 16,000 people who had lost their 
homes in the ﬁre had been rehoused on the same site by the end of 1964 
(see Latif 2009: 81–84).10
In its initial years of operation, the HDB followed the British public 
housing model of providing only rental units. It began offering housing 
units for sale on 99-year leasehold basis from 1964 under its Home 
Ownership for the People scheme.11 The HDB priced housing units 
affordably for households with incomes not exceeding S$800 a month 
and offered loans such that owners paid less in monthly mortgage 
payments than they would have done in rents. 
Price subsidies and housing grants are given to eligible households 
at the point of purchase and not deferred. Government support for 
the HDB is in the form of (i) annual grants from the current budget to 
cover its deﬁcits incurred for developing, maintaining, and upgrading 
of estates; (ii) loans for mortgage lending and long-term development 
purposes; and (iii) land allocation for HDB housing and comprehensive 
HDB town planning. 
The HDB brought about a transformation on the housing supply 
side. Table 5.3 shows the rate of increase in population and the stock of 
housing from 1970 to 2015. Housing units increased by about 50% in each 
decade from 1970 to 2000, outstripping population growth. In particular, 
HDB housing displaced private housing as low-density shop houses, 
squatter settlements, and villages were acquired by the government and 
demolished to make way for high-rise ﬂats. The homeownership rate 
doubled within 1 decade, from 29% in 1970 to 59% in 1980, and reached 
88% by 1990. From 2000 to 2010, the pace of housing construction 
slowed dramatically and was below the population growth rate of 26% 
(Table 5.3). 
10 As a consequence of the ﬁre, an amendment was passed to allow land that had been 
devastated by ﬁre to be acquired at not more than one-third of the value of the vacant 
site, unless the minister speciﬁed otherwise. The one-third ﬁgure was to ensure that 
landowners did not beneﬁt from an appreciation in the value of their land that would 
then be free from encumbrances.
11 See references in footnote 9, and the HDB website at http://www.hdb.gov.sg
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A major policy innovation in 1968 was for the government to 
utilize the CPF as a vehicle for housing ﬁnance. In 1968, a new law was 
introduced to allow withdrawals from the fund to ﬁnance the purchase 
of housing sold by the HDB. Both employers and employees contributed 
a certain percentage of the individual employee’s monthly salary toward 
the employee’s personal and portable account in the fund. When the 
CPF was established in 1955, the contribution rate was 10% (5% each 
by employees and employers) of the monthly salary. With the new law 
in 1968, the contribution rates were raised steadily, and by 1984, they 
were 25% of wages. The contribution rates in 2016 are 20% of wages 
for employees and 17% of wages for employers, up to a monthly salary 
ceiling of S$6,000.12 
Figure 5.2 shows a schematic view of the mobilization of domestic 
savings for housing ﬁnance through the CPF. Between 1968 and 1981, 
CPF savings could only be for payments related to the purchase of 
public-sector-built housing (such as down payment or stamp duties). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the scheme was gradually liberalized, 
allowing for withdrawals for other, nonhousing-related purposes such 
as medical expenditures. The interest rate on CPF Ordinary Account 
savings yields a minimum of 2.5%.13 
The HDB receives government loans to ﬁnance its mortgage lending 
and pays interest at the prevailing CPF savings rate. The HDB uses the 
loans to provide mortgage loans and mortgage insurance to buyers of its 
leasehold ﬂats (both new and resale). The typical loan represents 80% 
of the price of the ﬂat. The maximum repayment period is limited to 25 
years. Every household can apply for a maximum of two HDB loans. The 
mortgage interest rate charged by the HDB is pegged at 0.1 percentage 
point above the CPF ordinary account savings interest rate. (The latter 
is based on savings rates offered by the commercial banks, subject to a 
minimum of 2.5%.) 
Table 5.4 shows data for net assets, contributions, and withdrawals 
made by CPF members as a proportion of GDP for 2014. Net assets of the 
CPF are 71% of GDP, contributions by members comprise 7% of GDP, and 
net withdrawals are 4% of GDP. Withdrawals for the purpose of housing 
payments dominate and comprised 55% of total net withdrawals. 
12 For details, see the CPF web page at https://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/employers/
employerguides/employer-guides/paying-cpf-contributions/cpf-contribution-and-
allocation-rates
13 From 1 January 2008, an extra 1% interest per year is paid on the ﬁrst S$60,000 of 
a member’s combined balances. See the CPF web page on details of interest rates 
payable for various accounts at https://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-
us-info/cpf-interest-rates. Historical interest rates can be found at https://mycpf.cpf.
gov.sg/Assets/common/Documents/InterestRate.pdf
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The integrated HDB–CPF framework contributed to the growth 
of housing loans and the development of the mortgage sector as 
homeownership rates increased. The ratio of housing mortgage loans 
to GDP was only 4% in 1970; it increased to 10% by 1980 and to 62% by 
2000. In 2014, the resident households’ housing mortgage loans-to-GDP 
ratio was 55.5%. Between 1970 and 2000, HDB outstanding mortgage 
loans accounted for more than 50% of total housing loans (Phang 2001). 
In 2002, the government amended its policy to allow banks instead of 
the CPF to have ﬁrst claim on a property should a borrower default 
on his or her mortgage loan (Phang 2003). This paved the way for 
commercial banks to enter the HDB mortgage market from 2003. With 
the low interest rate environment in recent years, commercial banks 
have been able to offer loans at rates below the HDB mortgage loans’ 
2.6% interest ﬂoor. Financial institutions have since increased their 
share of outstanding housing mortgage loans to more than 80% of the 
total (see Table 5.4). 
Figure 5.2: Mobilization of Domestic Savings for Housing 
through the Central Provident Fund
CPF = Central Provident Fund, HDB = Housing & Development Board. 
Sources: Modiﬁed from Phang (2007, 2013a).
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Table 5.4: Central Provident Fund Assets, Contributions,  
and Withdrawals by Purpose, 2014
S$ million % of GDP 
GDP 390,089 – 
Resident households’ outstanding 
mortgage loans with ﬁnancial institutions 179,578 46.0
Resident households’ HDB mortgages 37,178 9.5
CPF net assets 277,778 71.2
CPF contributions by members 27,917 7.2
CPF total withdrawals (net of refunds) 
17,298 4.4
Purpose of Withdrawal S$ million
% of CPF total net 
withdrawals
HDB housing 6,892 39.8
Private housing 2,706 15.6
Attained the age of 55 years* 4,266 24.7
Medisave and medical insurance 2,162 12.5
Purchase of life-long annuity 2,069 12.0
– = data not available, CPF = Central Provident Fund, GDP = gross domestic product. 
* Or leaving Singapore and West Malaysia permanently, as well as on grounds of death or permanent 
incapacitation.
Sources: Singapore Department of Statistics and CPF Financial Statements, 2014.
5.4The Role of Markets
In a heavily state-dominated and highly regulated sector, marketization 
of HDB ﬂats has taken place in phases. In the 1960s and 1970s, when 
there were long waiting lists for HDB ﬂats, the HDB allocated ﬂats with 
priority given to households affected by resettlement and on a ﬁrst-
come-ﬁrst-served basis for other households. Separate waiting lists 
were maintained for rental and sale ﬂats, and applicants could state 
their preferred zone and type of ﬂat desired. The waiting lists averaged 
70,000 households per year between 1971 and 1985 (Phang 1992: 166). 
During this period of general shortage, there was policy concern that 
HDB dwellings should not become a vehicle for speculation by allowing 
the price subsidies to be capitalized on a secondary market. There were 
thus numerous regulations concerning the resale of HDB ﬂats, which 
restricted household mobility. 
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Restrictions on resale took the following forms:
ƀǇ Ban on market transactions prior to 1971: The HDB required 
owners who wished to sell their ﬂats to return them to the 
HDB at the original purchase price plus the depreciated cost of 
improvements.
ƀǇ Minimum occupancy period: In 1971, HDB allowed owners 
who had resided in their ﬂats for a minimum of 3 years to 
sell their ﬂats at market prices to buyers of their choice who 
satisﬁed the eligibility requirements for HDB homeownership. 
The minimum occupancy period before resale was increased to 
5 years in 1973 and has remained in place since.
ƀǇ Debarment period: In 1971, when resale became permitted, 
those who sold their ﬂat were debarred from buying another 
HDB ﬂat for a year. The debarment period was increased to 2.5 
years in 1975. The debarment period did not allow for household 
mobility within the HDB sector and was a great deterrent 
for any household considering sale of its dwelling. This was 
abolished in 1979, thereby greatly facilitating transactions 
within the public housing sector. 
ƀǇ Resale levies: In 1979, in place of the debarment period, a 
5% levy on the transacted price of the dwelling was imposed 
on the seller to “reduce windfall proﬁts.” A system of graded 
resale levies, based on ﬂat type, was introduced in 1982. Rules 
regarding circumstances under which levies could be waived 
were ﬁne-tuned in the 1980s. The resale levy system in its 
current form ensures that the subsidy on the second new ﬂat 
purchased by the household from the HDB is smaller than that 
for the ﬁrst-time HDB ﬂat buyer. 
Only citizens, nonowners of any other residential property, 
households with a minimum size of two persons with household 
incomes below the income ceiling set by the HDB, were eligible to 
purchase new or resale HDB ﬂats before 1989. These rules restricted 
mobility even as household incomes increased. Phang (1992) found that, 
in 1981, 31% of multiple-worker HDB households with length of tenure 
greater than 5 years were no longer eligible to purchase HDB ﬂats. The 
consequence for commuting time was that, on average, workers residing 
in HDB housing commuted greater distances by 2.2 minutes of auto time 
or 5.6 minutes of transit time, as compared with those residing in private 
apartments. 
As the housing shortage eased and households sought to upgrade 
their housing or change their location, there was a need to amend resale 
Housing Policies in Singapore  189
regulations on the eligibility of buyers to facilitate household mobility 
within the HDB sector, as well as from the HDB to the private sector 
and vice versa. Facilitating the development of an HDB resale market 
through deregulation speeded up in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This 
could also be considered in line with the then worldwide trend toward 
privatization and deregulation. 
The following restrictions on purchasers of HDB resale ﬂats were 
relaxed in 1989:
ƀǇ Income caps for buyers: The income ceiling restriction was 
removed for buyers of HDB resale ﬂats.
ƀǇ Nationality status of buyers: Permanent residents were allowed 
to purchase HDB resale ﬂats for owner-occupancy.
ƀǇ Private housing ownership: Private housing owners were 
allowed to purchase HDB resale ﬂats for owner-occupancy. 
HDB-ﬂat owners, who could not own any other residential 
property before, could also invest in private-sector–built 
dwellings.
From 1991, single citizens above the age of 35 years were allowed 
to purchase HDB resale ﬂats for owner-occupancy. This was the ﬁrst 
instance of HDB’s recognition of the needs of single citizens to own 
their own homes independently.14 In 1993, measures to deregulate HDB 
ﬁnancing for resale ﬂats were introduced. At that time, the HDB was the 
only source of ﬁnance for buyers of resale HDB ﬂats. 
The volume of transactions of resale HDB ﬂats increased from fewer 
than 800 units in 1979 to 13,000 units in 1987 and 60,000 units in 1999. 
The number of resale transactions was 31,000 in 2004 and 37,000 in 
2009; it declined to 17,000 in 2014 (a 10-year low)—a result of numerous 
interventions to “cool” the property market.15 The effects of these policy 
measures on housing prices are further discussed in the next section.
14 The CPF housing grant was extended to single citizens (age 35 and above) in 1998. 
Since 2013, eligible single citizens above 35 can buy a new two-room HDB ﬂat direct 
from the HDB. They may also apply for Additional and Special Housing Grants. 
See http://www.hdb.gov.sg/cs/infoweb/residential/buying-a-ﬂat/new/single-
singapore-citizen-scheme  
15 Resale volume data from HDB Annual Reports and HDB website at http://www.hdb.
gov.sg/ﬁ10/ﬁ10321p.nsf/w/BuyResaleFlatNumberofResaleApplications?OpenDocu
ment
190The Housing Challenge in Emerging Asia: Options and Solutions
5.5Supply-Side versus Demand-Side Interventions
Consistent with the shift toward a greater reliance on the market, the 
government introduced CPF housing grants for the purchase of resale 
HDB ﬂats in 1994. This demand-side policy was a shift from the previous 
supply-side interventions. The subsidy was provided to eligible ﬁrst-time 
applicant households and deposited in their CPF accounts. The grants, 
however, carried the risk that they could be capitalized into housing 
prices. The risk was exacerbated by the simultaneous deregulation of 
the resale market, in particular the removal of the income ceiling and 
citizenship restrictions, and the resale HDB prices indeed started to 
increase. Figure 5.3 shows the rate of increase in price indexes for both 
private housing and HDB resale ﬂats from 1991. Following housing 
ﬁnance deregulation in 1993, HDB resale prices increased sharply (by 
71%) within the same year. The HDB resale prices rose further after 
the introduction of CPF housing grants in 1994. This price increase had 
to be expected, because resale public and private housing markets had 
become less segmented since high-income citizens as well as permanent 
residents could purchase HDB resale ﬂats. 
Figure 5.3: Changes in Housing Price Indexes, 1991–2015
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The government reacted by an increase in the HDB supply of new 
housing, the introduction of a new executive condominium scheme, 
as well as an increase in government land sales for private housing 
development. However, the housing prices continued to soar, with 
HDB resale price increases much higher than private housing price 
increases in the 1993, 1995, and 1996 (Figure 5.3). To bring prices down, 
the government introduced a package of antispeculation measures on 
15 May 1996. These measures included capital gains taxes on the sale of 
any property within 3 years of purchase, stamp duty on every sale and 
subsale of property, limitation of housing loans to 80% of property value, 
as well as limiting foreigners to non-Singapore-dollar–denominated 
housing loans. The HDB also changed various regulations to bring 
demand down, such as limiting HDB ﬂat buyers to two loans from the 
HDB where there had been no limit before. 
The effects of these measures coincided with the onset of the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997 and housing prices fell sharply. The decline in 
HDB resale prices was less than the decline in private housing prices in 
1998. To avoid too steep a fall, the government stopped land sales and 
reduced stepwise the CPF housing grants. As a consequence, both the 
private and public housing sectors were confronted with a situation 
of unsold units. As described in Phang (2007), in early 2002, the HDB 
suspended its Registration for Flats (queueing) System and ensured 
that new ﬂats were only built when there was sufficient demand for 
them. Other major restructuring measures followed, which resulted in 
a sharp curtailment of the HDB building program; from 2000 to 2010, 
the number of HDB dwelling units increased by a mere 6% (Table 5.3). 
During the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, HDB prices were 
remarkably resilient and continued to increase while private housing 
prices fell. In the post-2008 global ﬁnancial crisis period, limited supply, 
rapid population increase, the low interest rate environment, and high 
global liquidity, resulting from accommodative monetary policies of 
central banks in developed economies, led to accelerated price increases of 
Singapore property. Over the decades, the upward trend in Singapore real 
estate prices had caused housing (both HDB and private) to be viewed as 
an attractive investment class as compared with other asset classes. This 
view has been reinforced by official statements from the government that 
HDB ﬂats are assets which it commits “to upgrade” and “whose value can 
be unlocked for retirement, if needed” (Ministry of National Development 
2011b). This approach raises intergenerational equity implications and 
questions about the longer-term sustainability of relying on appreciating 
house prices to ﬁnance retirement (Phang 2012). 
The continuous upward trend in prices and the economic and 
political risks of a housing bubble and increasingly unaffordable housing 
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compelled the government to intervene. Since 2006, the Government 
of Singapore has announced several consecutive rounds of “cooling” 
measures to curb investment demand for housing. Over the same 
period, to enhance housing affordability, housing grants which allowed 
the HDB to better price-discriminate based on household incomes 
became a feature of the HDB pricing policy. As eligibility for HDB new 
subsidized ﬂats and CPF housing grants (of S$40,000) extended to over 
80% of Singapore citizen households, subsidies needed to be better 
calibrated to household incomes. 
The Additional CPF Housing Grant (AHG) was introduced in 2006 
(and enhanced in 2007 and 2009) to allow families with lower incomes 
to receive a higher grant amount that could be used for either a new 
ﬂat or a resale ﬂat. The amount of the AHG depends on the average 
gross monthly household income. Households with monthly household 
incomes less than S$5,000 are eligible for the AHG. The AHG ranges 
from S$5,000 (for households with incomes from S$4,501 to S$5,000) to 
S$40,000 (for households with incomes below S$1,500). 
The Special Housing Grant was introduced in 2011 to help 
households buy four-room or smaller new ﬂats in non-mature estates 
directly from the HDB. The Special Housing Grant was enhanced in 
2012, signiﬁcantly expanded in 2013, and expanded again in 2015.16 The 
amount of the Special Housing Grant depends on the average gross 
monthly household income. Households with household incomes less 
than S$8,500 per month are eligible for the grant. The amount of the 
grant ranges from S$5,000 for households with incomes from S$8,000 
to S$8,500, to S$40,000 for households with incomes below S$5,000.  
A Step-Up Housing Grant (of S$15,000) was introduced in 2013 to 
help families in subsidized two-room HDB ﬂats in non-mature estates 
upgrade to purchase three-room HDB ﬂats in non-mature estates. The 
net effect of these several housing grants is to allow the HDB to price its 
ﬂats based on a household’s ability to pay thus ensuring that almost all 
employed citizens can afford to own a home. 
From independence, homeownership affordability has always been 
a very visible symbol of the government’s “ability to fulﬁll its promise 
to improve the living conditions of the entire nation” (Chua 1997: 139). 
The ratio of the price of a new HDB four-room ﬂat to median household 
income was generally 4.0 or less before 2005 (Phang 2009, 2010). 
HDB resale prices are generally higher than new ﬂat prices as they are 
market-determined and there is no waiting period for construction 
16 In August 2015, the government increased the maximum grant amount from 
S$20,000 to S$40,000. The income ceiling for households to qualify to receive the 
Special Housing Grant was raised from S$6,500 to S$8,500. 
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to be completed. Figure 5.4 shows the ratio of the median HDB four-
room ﬂat resale price to median resident employed household annual 
income. The ratio was generally below 4.5 before 2008 and rose to above 
5.0 from 2010 to 2012. As prices in the HDB resale market rose, new 
HDB ﬂat prices followed a similar trend, outstripping income growth. 
Although the median-income household would be able to easily afford 
a new HDB ﬁve-room ﬂat in a new town location at around 4 times the 
annual income in 2006, the price had increased to closer to 6 times the 
annual income by 2011 (Phang 2012). The introduction of new housing 
grants enhanced affordability but contributed to house price increases 
during the period when new HDB housing supply was minimal. 
Moreover, what is affordable may not be available, as new HDB 
build-to-order projects were reportedly oversubscribed (e.g., by up to 
5 times in a February 2011 exercise). Dissatisfaction over rising prices 
and difficulties in securing HDB housing were among the factors that 
contributed to a 6% swing in votes against the PAP in the May 2011 
elections (from the 2006 elections) to 60%, its lowest since independence. 
The opposition Workers’ Party won six seats in Parliament, including a 
group representation constituency of ﬁve seats, the ﬁrst time a group 
representation constituency had been won by an opposition party. 
In what may be interpreted as a response to these developments, the 
government increased the household income ceiling for the purchase 
of new HDB ﬂats from S$8,000 a month to S$10,000 a month in August 
2011 (Ministry of National Development 2011a). The income ceiling for 
eligibility to purchase an executive condominium was also increased, 
from S$10,000 to S$12,000. In August 2015, the government further 
increased the monthly household income ceilings from S$10,000 to 
S$12,000 for purchasing a new HDB ﬂat, and from S$12,000 to S$14,000 
for a new executive condominium (H. L. Lee 2015). These changes 
enable even more young Singaporean households to enjoy housing 
subsidies for homeownership—the median household income among all 
employed households was S$8,292 in 2014 according to the Department 
of Statistics.
In what can be described as a retreat from the market, new HDB ﬂats 
have since 2013 been offered at prices that are “delinked” from market 
prices. In 2013, the Minister for National Development announced that 
he aimed to bring down build-to-order prices from about 5.5 times 
applicant households’ median annual income to 4 times their median 
annual income. In 2014, after grants, three-room build-to-order ﬂats 
cost 4.57 times the annual median applicant households’ annual income 
(Table 5.5). Four- and ﬁve-room ﬂats were at prices that are at 5.26 times 
and 5.36 times applicant households’ annual incomes, respectively (The 
Straits Times, 17 November 2014). 
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Numerous measures have been introduced to cool the housing 
market between 2006 and 2013. The measures introduced include the 
following:17
ƀǇ Prohibiting developers from allowing purchasers to defer stamp 
duty and interest payments to a later date
ƀǇ Prohibition of interest-only housing loans
ƀǇ Seller stamp duty 
ƀǇ Loan-to-value ratio limits
ƀǇ Additional buyer stamp duty
ƀǇ Tenor restriction limit
ƀǇ Three-year waiting period before new SPRs are eligible to 
purchase resale HDB ﬂats
ƀǇ Mortgage service ratio limit
ƀǇ Total debt service ratio limit
17 For details of these measures, see Lee et al. (2013) and http://www.srx.com.sg/
cooling-measures 
Figure 5.4: Median HDB Four-Room Flat Resale Price to 
Median Household Income Ratio
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Table 5.5: Price Affordability of HDB Flats in 2014 
HDB Flat Type
Average  
BTO Price
Average BTO 
Price after 
Grants
Applicants’ 
Median 
Annual 
Household 
Income
Ratio of Price 
(after Grants) 
to Income
2-room $110,000 $55,000 $19,200 2.86
3-room $187,000 $137,000 $30,000 4.57
4-room $295,000 $265,000 $50,400 5.26
5-room $386,000 $386,000 $72,000 5.36
BTO = build-to-order, HDB = Housing & Development Board. 
Note: BTO refers to HDB ﬂats. Prices are for BTO ﬂats in non-mature estates.
Source: The Straits Times. 17 November 2014.
With the numerous market intervention measures introduced 
since 2006, it is difficult to isolate the price effects of a particular 
cooling measure or the extent to which housing grants were capitalized 
(Lee et al. 2013). The measures to cool the market can be viewed as 
macroprudential policies to stabilize housing prices, reduce the returns 
for housing investors, and preempt a housing bubble from developing.  
The housing tax and subsidy framework in Singapore is highly 
progressive. The basic idea is that wealthy property owners and 
investors are taxed and the receipts used to subsidize homeownership 
of lower-income groups. Table 5.6 provides a simpliﬁed picture of the 
progressivity of the housing tax and subsidy framework at the point of 
purchase. Aiming for a fair and targeted outcome, the effective housing 
subsidy is based on multiple criteria. For example, in 2015, the Proximity 
Housing Grant was set up to enhance grants for households purchasing 
a resale HDB ﬂat close to their parents or children. 
To further curb the housing demand, the government has been 
increasing the supply of HDB ﬂats since 2011. With the increase in supply 
of both HDB and private housing, the shortage of housing has started to 
decline. The government, however, aims to ensure that housing remains 
an attractive investment; one reason being that the wealth of many 
citizens is locked into housing and a sudden fall of housing prices would 
have considerable negative wealth effects.
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5.6 Promoting Racial Integration: The Ethnic 
Integration Policy
Singapore citizens and permanent residents are of different racial and 
religious backgrounds. The HDB’s objective has always been to integrate 
the various income and racial groups within the public housing program 
and to avoid the emergence of low-income or ethnic ghettos. This policy 
was a consequence of events in the 1960s, when there were episodes of 
ethnic violence between the Chinese and the Malays that resulted in 
several deaths and injuries. Racial harmony has since been a goal of the 
government (Ooi, Siddique, and Soh 1993). Beginning in the 1970s, the 
HDB allocated new ﬂats in a manner that would give a “good distribution 
of races” to different new towns. However, by 1988, a trend of ethnic 
regrouping through the resale market was highlighted as a social problem 
which could lead, over time, to the reemergence of ethnic enclaves. 
In 1989, the government implemented the Ethnic Integration 
Policy under which racial limits were set for the HDB blocks and 
neighborhoods.18 The Chinese, Malay, Indian/Others neighborhood 
18 Dodge (2006) devotes a chapter to Singapore’s Ethnic Integration Policy in his 
book on Thomas Schelling. Schelling’s models on the neighborhood “tipping” 
phenomenon that would quickly lead to total segregation of different ethnic groups 
were inﬂuential in the Singapore government’s adoption of policies to control the 
movement of population groups in the public housing sector. 
Table 5.6: Progressivity of Housing Purchase Taxes and Subsidies
Residency/Incomes/Housing Types
Additional Buyer Stamp Duty (+)
Price Subsidy (–)
Foreigners 15%
SPR investors 10%
Singaporean investors 7%
SPR homeowners 5%
Singaporean high-income homeowners 0%
Executive Condominium –10%
HDB 5-room –12%
HDB 4-room –20%
HDB 3-room –35%
HDB 2-room –50%
HDB = Housing & Development Board, SPR = Singapore permanent resident.
Note: Estimates of price subsidies based on difference between resale market prices and new ﬂat prices.
Source: Authors.
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limits were set at 84%, 22%, and 10%, respectively.19 The block quotas 
were 3% above each neighborhood limit. For new ﬂats, a particular 
ethnic group will not be able to buy a ﬂat from the HDB if the quota for 
that group has been reached for the particular block or neighborhood 
(Centre for Liveable Cities and HDB 2013: chapter 5). For the resale 
market, when the set ethnic group limits for a particular block or 
neighborhood are reached, those wishing to sell their HDB ﬂats in the 
particular block or neighborhood are constrained to sell them to another 
household of the same ethnic group. The government had emphasized 
that “our multiracial policies must continue if we are to develop a more 
cohesive, better-integrated society. Singapore’s racial harmony, long-
term stability, and even viability as a nation depend on it” (quoted in 
Ooi, Siddique, and Soh 1993: 14).  
The HDB integration policy for its housing estates has worked 
remarkably well in Singapore and has contributed to social integration 
of the different races. In a May 2015 interview, Deputy Prime Minister 
Tharman Shanmugaratnam described this policy as “the most intrusive 
policy in Singapore” which “has turned out to be the most important.”20  
However, the restriction in selling to the same ethnic group has 
resulted in some market-distortionary effects. In a careful study, 
Wong (2013) matched more than 500,000 names in the phone book to 
ethnicities to calculate ethnic proportions at the apartment block level. 
She then investigated transaction price and time-on-market duration 
differences for constrained and unconstrained blocks using 35,744 
transactions between April 2005 and August 2006. On average, Wong 
(2013) found the transaction prices for Chinese-constrained units to 
be 5% higher than transactions in comparable unconstrained blocks. 
Conversely, the prices for Malay- and Indian-constrained units were 3% 
lower.21 She also estimated longer time-on-market durations of between 
1 and 1.4 months for constrained sellers. 
In March 2010, in response to the increase in the number of SPRs 
living in public housing estates, the HDB introduced a new SPR quota for 
non-Malaysian SPR families buying ﬂats to facilitate better integration 
and to prevent new SPR enclaves from forming in public housing estates. 
The SPR quota is set at 5% and 8% at the neighborhood and block levels, 
19 In March 2010, in response to changing demographics, the neighborhood limit for 
Indian/Others was raised to 12%.
20 “An Investigative Interview: Singapore 50 Years after Independence,” 45th St Gallen 
Symposium, May 2015. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpwPciW74b8
21 Using an average price of units sold (S$234,000), Wong (2013) estimated these price 
differences to represent 5 times the median monthly income of the Chinese (S$2,335) 
and 3 times the median monthly income of the Malays (S$1,790) and the Indians 
(S$2,167).   
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respectively. Malaysian SPR buyers are not subject to the SPR quota 
as they are considered to have close cultural and historical similarities 
with Singaporeans.22 
5.7 Land Lease System and the Lease Buyback 
Scheme
5.7.1Land Lease System 
With about 90% of the land owned by the state, all HDB ﬂats and most 
high-rise private condominiums are sold on a 99-year leasehold basis. 
The limited number of freehold properties command a premium over 
comparable leasehold properties as the value of leasehold properties at 
the termination of the lease is expected to fall to zero. The Singapore 
Land Authority provides a Leasehold Table, which expresses the value 
of the residual tenure as a percentage of freehold value of land.23
Capozza and Sick (1991) have shown that leasehold landowners will 
redevelop earlier and at a lower intensity as compared with freehold 
owners, because the value of the developed land at the termination of 
the lease is lower (or zero) as compared with the freehold case. This 
may represent an unintended consequence of having a housing and land 
market based on a lease structure. However, in the case of Singapore, 
these lower development intensity effects do not exist for land leases 
sold by the government because the government deﬁnes the land use, 
development intensity (plot ratio), and time-to-project completion 
under the Government Land Sales Programme. The detailed planning 
regulations basically strip away development options and reduce the 
uncertainty linked to the optimal time to exercise the real option of land 
development, thus accelerating investments (Cunningham 2007). 
Another effect of leaseholds is that investment in maintenance for 
properties may be lower as compared with freehold properties. One may 
22 A non-Malaysian SPR household buyer must satisfy both the ethnic proportion and 
SPR quota to qualify to buy a resale HDB ﬂat. The ethnic proportions and SPR quota 
are updated on the ﬁrst day of every month and buyers/sellers can check the status 
of a unit online. See HDB web page at
 http://www.hdb.gov.sg/ﬁ10/ﬁ10296p.nsf/PressReleases/C515273FA068DD5848257
6DD00169155?OpenDocument
23 The Leasehold Table is used together with the Table of Development Charge for the 
computation of differential premiums payable when state title restrictions involving 
change of use and/or increase in intensity of use for leasehold land are lifted. See 
http://www.sla.gov.sg/Portals/0/Services/Land%20Lease%20Conditions/DP%20
policy%20wef%2031%20Jul%202000.pdf 
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hypothesize that a similar argument may apply to HDB ﬂats and private 
leasehold properties: because capital investments are lost when the 
lease expires, there is a disincentive for households to improve—or even 
hold constant—the ﬂat quality. This disincentive may be responsible for 
the more rapid deterioration of the housing stock built on leased land as 
compared with freehold land. 
In the case of Singapore, as a consequence of rapid economic growth 
and increases in population, economic obsolescence has preceded 
physical obsolescence for many buildings several decades before the 
typical 99-year lease runs out. Moreover, the typical housing-ﬁltering 
process does not operate in Singapore because private housing does 
not ﬁlter to the middle-income segment of the market that is served by 
the HDB. In the case of privately owned properties, en bloc sales have 
facilitated redevelopment (Phang 2005).
Until 1991, Singapore operated with two plans for land-use 
purposes: the Master Plan was statutory and revised every 5 years; the 
Concept Plan was approved but not released to the public (Dale 1999: 
85). The 1990s was another period with regard to important policy 
decisions for physical land-use planning. The government adopted a 
more open approach to planning. A major review of the Concept Plan 
was completed and the revised plan was made public in 1991.    
The broad strategies of the 1991 Concept Plan were translated into 
a forward-looking Master Plan, which has since been reviewed every 5 
years.24 The development guide plans for 55 planning areas contain the 
planning vision for its area, and sets out the control parameters such as 
land use, plot ratio, building height, provision of facilities, and amenities. 
Zoning and plot-ratio prescriptions contained within each development 
guide plan could deviate from the current land use with the objective 
of guiding the physical development in a speciﬁc planning area and 
“unlocking” the redevelopment potential of privately held land parcels. 
To take advantage of the increase in development potential arising 
from the above changes in planning regulations, the developer would 
have to pay a differential premium based on the development charge 
(which had been introduced in 1965.25 The Development Charge Table 
is updated by the Ministry of National Development in consultation 
with the chief valuer every 6 months (on 1 September and 1 March). The 
current prescribed average land rates are based on 70% of estimated land 
24 The Master Plan can be accessed at https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/master-plan.
aspx?p1=View-Master-Plan
25 The Development Charge Table can be accessed at https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/DC/
apply-check-pay/apply-permission/DC-rates-archive.aspx
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values by eight land-use groups in 118 geographic sectors. In the case of 
leasehold land, developers are able to apply to top up the land lease.26 
However, many of these sites were held under residential strata title, 
which, prior to 1999, required that all the strata-titled property owners 
must unanimously agree to a sale. Many sales had to be aborted when a 
minority (in some cases, just one) of the owners refused to participate in 
the sale. Frustrated owners appealed to the government and, in 1999, the 
Land Titles (Strata) Act was amended to facilitate collective sales. The 
concerns of the majority were accepted by Parliament as legitimate and 
the actions of dissenting minority owners were described as “impeding 
efforts to maximize the development potential of en-bloc-sale sites and 
preventing the rejuvenation of older estates.”27  
In 1999, Parliament passed amendments to the Land Titles (Strata) 
Act that changed the 100% requirement for en bloc sale to a majority 
vote. The new provisions applied to only strata developments with 
more than 10 units. Where a development is less than 10 years old, there 
must be 90% agreement; for developments 10 years old or more, at least 
80% agreement suffices for collective sales (both ﬁgures based on share 
values). The Strata Titles Board reviews applications for collective sales. 
The Land Titles (Strata Titles Boards) Regulations 1999 sets out the 
procedure for applications to the board, the proceedings of the board, 
and other matters such as appeals to the board and the High Court. A 
study by Christudason (2010) shows that between 1999 and 2008, there 
were a total of 312 collective sales that resulted in 13,755 old private 
housing units being displaced by 35,888 new housing units.
In the HDB sector, a spatial age gradient for HDB estates had 
become evident by the late 1980s. As the city expanded outward from 
the central business district, older estates had been built closer to the 
central business district and new towns were built at distances further 
away. Also evident was the trend of younger families moving out of older 
HDB towns because they were allocated new ﬂats in outlying new towns. 
In 1989, HDB upgrading programs to improve existing HDB estates 
were announced by the government. The upgrading programs vary in 
nature and scale and are substantially subsidized by the government 
26 See the Singapore Land Authority web page for the document on “The Differential 
Premium System” at http://www.sla.gov.sg/Portals/0/Services/Land%20Lease%20
Conditions/DP%20policy%20wef%2031%20Jul%202000.pdf. The topping-up of a 
lease tenure allows for a better Pareto optimum to be reached, as explained by Dale-
Johnson (2001). The computation of the premium payable for the topping-up of lease 
tenure is assessed by the chief valuer on a case-by-case basis.
27 See Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 
presented to Parliament on 19 April 1999. See Christudason (2010) for details of the 
legislation and the effects on private housing supply. 
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(Centre for Liveable Cities 2013: 20). The government also launched the 
Selective En bloc Redevelopment Scheme (SERS) in 1995 under which 
older low-density blocks of HDB ﬂats were acquired and demolished. 
From 1995 to 2014, 79 sites were redeveloped through the SERS. Affected 
households are resettled in new and higher-density housing with fresh 
99-year leases within the same neighborhood.28
5.8 Housing Wealth and Retirement Financing: 
The Lease Buyback Scheme
In 2015, data from household sector balance sheets show housing assets 
owned by the resident household sector to be about 2.1 times GDP.29 The 
ratio of the net housing wealth to GDP was 1.5, while the ratio of the 
total net wealth to GDP was 3.8. The typical household in Singapore thus 
has a large fraction of its wealth invested in housing. However, housing 
wealth is illiquid and the study by McCarthy, Mitchell, and Piggott 
(2002) shows that the average worker in Singapore is often asset-rich 
but cash-poor upon retirement, as 75% of the retirement wealth is locked 
into housing assets. A report by the government-appointed Economic 
Review Committee (2002) came to a very similar conclusion. 
With a high homeownership rate and aging homeowners, there was 
a need for instruments through which households could monetize their 
housing asset (Phang 2015b). A local insurance ﬁrm, NTUC Income, was 
the ﬁrst to introduce a reverse mortgage scheme for private housing 
in 1997. In 2006, a Singaporean bank, OCBC Bank launched a reverse 
mortgage scheme for owners of private property, and NTUC Income 
extended reverse mortgages to HDB homeowners. However, both 
institutions have since discontinued the schemes citing a lack of demand. 
Koh (2015) highlighted the lease system as the primary challenge for 
designing a viable reverse mortgage instrument. The instruments on 
offer stipulated that the property had to have at least 70 years of lease 
remaining to be eligible, with the condition that, at the end of the reverse 
mortgage, there had to be at least 50 years of lease remaining.
To address the problem, the HDB introduced the Lease Buyback 
Scheme (LBS) in 2009 for low-income elderly (aged 63 or older) living in 
28 See the HDB web page on the SERS at http://www.hdb.gov.sg/ﬁ10/ﬁ10329p.nsf/w/
eSERSOverview?OpenDocument and the list of SERS sites (79 sites) from 1995 to 
2014 at http://www.teoalida.com/singapore/serslist/
29 See Department of Statistics web page at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/
browse-by-theme/household-sector-balance-sheet
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three-room or smaller ﬂats. In 2014, the Prime Minister announced the 
enhancement of the LBS to four-room ﬂats (H. L. Lee 2014). To illustrate, 
an HDB four-room ﬂat, bought for approximately S$24,300 in 1980, 
lived in for 34 years, is valued at S$450,000 in 2015. It can be retained 
for the next 30 years, and have the 35 years of its end-lease purchased 
by the HDB in 2015 for S$190,000 to help ﬁnance the retirement of the 
now elderly homeowners. This is the provision of a retirement safety 
net based on ownership of an HDB ﬂat, with the HDB taking on both 
interest-rate risk and housing price-depreciation risk over a long period 
of 30 years (Koh 2015). The housing price-depreciation risk is likely 
to be exacerbated by the homeowner’s disincentive to invest in ﬂat 
renovation and maintenance as the property approaches the end of the 
retained lease period. Although this disincentive might be negligible for 
low-income households, which may have less ﬁnancial ability to meet 
these costs, it is likely to be signiﬁcant for middle-income households. 
The impact of the disincentive would have increased substantially with 
the extension of the LBS to four-room ﬂats.30 
Other monetization options that have been provided or made 
possible by the HDB for eligible elderly households include the 
following: 
ƀǇ A Silver Housing Bonus incentive (of up to S$20,000) to sell 
their current ﬂat and buy a smaller ﬂat (right-sizing) 
ƀǇ A related measure, the two-room Flexi Scheme, was introduced 
in 2015, which allows households, whose heads are over the 
age of 55, to buy two-room HDB ﬂats on shorter leases than 
99 years. The shorter lease means the price of the home is 
signiﬁcantly reduced. The household can choose the lease 
duration to purchase, with the minimum duration dependent 
on the age of the household members.31
ƀǇ Subletting a room or putting their ﬂat up for rental for a steady 
ﬂow of income.32  
30 The Enhanced LBS took effect in April 2015, and the HDB received 450 applications 
in April and May, of which 214 were owners of four-room ﬂats. A total of 965 
households took up the LBS between 2009 and March 2015 (The Straits Times, 12 
June 2015).
31 Shorter lease periods range from 15 to 45 years. Under the scheme, buyers must choose 
a lease period that will last them and their spouse until they are at least 95 years old. 
The two-room Flexi Scheme merges and replaces the two-room ﬂat scheme and 
Studio Apartment (30-year lease) scheme. For details, see http://www.hdb.gov.sg/ﬁ10/
ﬁ10321p.nsf/w/BuyingNewFlatEligibility2roomFlexiﬂats?OpenDocument
32 See H. L. Lee (2014) and HDB web page at http://www.hdb.gov.sg/ﬁ10/ﬁ10325p.
nsf/w/MaxFinancesOverview?OpenDocument
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5.9 Conclusion: Lessons Learned for Other 
Asian Countries
Singapore’s housing system has evolved over time as a symbiotic 
relationship between the HDB and the CPF, with generous support from 
the Ministry of Finance. The HDB–CPF system has contributed to high 
savings and homeownership rates, and very effectively mobilized savings 
for housing and growth of housing loans. The provision of affordable 
housing has contributed to social stability, economic growth, and the 
development of communities. The large HDB sector with its regulations 
on ownership and resale contributes to reducing speculative demand for 
housing. The CPF rate adjustments, with their impacts on inﬂation and 
wage costs, have been useful as a macroeconomic instrument for a very 
open economy. It is not surprising that the HDB hosts numerous visits 
each year from foreign delegations wishing to learn from Singapore’s 
housing experience. 
Lessons that can be learned from the Singapore model of housing 
include the following:
(i) Housing’s contribution to economic development: The 
housing and housing ﬁnance sectors can contribute positively 
and signiﬁcantly to the economic and ﬁnancial development of 
a country. Singapore’s macroeconomic environment has been 
one of high savings and income growth, low unemployment, 
inﬂation and interest rates, and government budgetary 
surpluses, as well as exchange rate appreciation. Housing 
policy has also been used to promote racial integration, which, 
in turn, has contributed to social stability and economic growth.
(ii) Homeownership affordability: Establishing an integrated 
land, housing supply, and mortgage ﬁnance framework can 
deliver dramatic increases in housing supply and improvements 
in homeownership affordability. 
(iii) Urban governments: In urban areas, governments can greatly 
facilitate the speed of urban development and redevelopment 
through appropriate legislation, regulations, and institutions 
that enable increases in housing supply for a growing 
population.
(iv) Private sector: Notwithstanding the importance of the 
government’s role in urban development and mobilization of 
domestic savings, ﬁnancial institutions and private developers 
play an equally important role in the real estate sector. 
As markets mature, governments need to review policies 
periodically to assess their continued relevance.
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(v) Enabling markets: Markets are very important and creating 
and/or enabling markets to work more efficiently and allowing 
for private initiatives are very important aspects of housing 
policy. A symbiotic partnership between the government 
and private sector has helped Singapore to avoid the worst 
outcomes of the extremes of central planning and unplanned 
urbanization. 
(vi) Market transparency: Governments can play an important 
role in improving market transparency through provision of 
timely real estate market information. 
(vii) Housing subsidies: The short- and long-term implications 
of housing subsidies, explicit or implicit, supply- or demand-
side, within the entire system, need to be fully understood and 
periodically reviewed for sustainability and effective housing 
market intervention.  
(viii) Macroprudential regulation: The government has deployed 
multiple mitigations in parallel to reduce the risk of housing 
becoming a source of ﬁnance sector instability. Housing 
markets are carefully segmented and carefully regulated. 
The main source of capital for housing ﬁnance comes from 
domestic savings. That these are in the form of compulsory 
savings lowers default risks. 
(ix) Monetizing housing assets: The CPF system has been used 
to mobilize retirement savings for housing mortgage payments 
by young households. With an aging population, it is also 
necessary to design instruments for elderly homeowners to 
monetize housing assets for retirement ﬁnancing.
(x) Governance: The need for strong legislation and sound 
governance of housing agencies and ﬁnancial institutions 
cannot be overemphasized.
The system is not, however, without its critics and risks. The 
mandatory nature of the CPF, together with the dominance of the HDB, 
could have resulted in overallocation of resources to housing. The CPF 
collects from members more than what is required for housing. This 
could have crowded out consumption (Phang 2004) and, as CPF savings 
are illiquid, it has been cited as a reason behind a weak domestic start-
up sector (Bhaskaran 2003). The large allocation of savings for housing 
and the risk of housing price declines pose risks for retirement ﬁnancing 
(McCarthy, Mitchell, and Piggott 2002; Asher 2002; Phang 2007; Low 
2014). The phrase “asset rich and cash poor” neatly captures the basic 
problem, and policies in the past decade to help aging households 
monetize their housing equity, provide health subsidies for the elderly, 
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and workfare for lower-income workers represent steps toward a more 
comprehensive social security system. 
The affordable rental segment of Singapore’s housing market has 
also been marginalized by the deliberate and long-standing policy bias 
toward homeownership. The small proportion of HDB social rental 
housing comprises mostly one- and two-room ﬂats that house low-
income families.33 There is generally a shortage of affordable market 
rental units in the HDB sector as evident by the higher rental yield for 
HDB ﬂats as compared with private housing. With the increase in the 
foreign population in Singapore, there is a need to expand the affordable 
rental sector. One suggestion is to establish housing real estate investment 
trusts to help cater to the rental housing needs of an increasing number 
of SPRs and foreigners in Singapore as well as Singaporean households 
in transition (Phang 2013b; Phang et al. 2014). 
While the Singapore model has attracted much interest from other 
Asian countries (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2014), the transferability 
of Singapore’s experience to other countries needs to be juxtaposed 
with the local political and social context. In the housing policy sphere, 
a housing provident fund is relatively simple to set up if designed as 
a savings and payments institution. The more complex institution to 
replicate is the HDB, in particular its resettlement, town planning, and 
estate management capabilities, as well as attention to developing good-
quality affordable housing on a large scale. Moreover, the tactics on 
which Singapore relies—compulsory savings, state land ownership, and 
state provision of housing—can easily spawn widespread inefficiency 
and corruption in other sociopolitical contexts.  
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